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CASE NOTES
DOMESTIC RELATIONS - Conflict of Laws - Mar-
riage of First Cousins. - Appellee and decedent, first cou-
sins and residents of Arizona, were married in New Mexico,
where such marriage is valid. They returned to Arizona,
and continued to reside there until decedent's death. Appellee,
first in order of preference under Arizona law, petitioned for
letters of administration, and appellant, son of decedent by a
former marriage, also filed application for letters of adminis-
tration and filed objections to appointment of appellee on the
ground that she was not the lawful widow of decedent. The
trial court ordered letters to be issued to appellee. On appeal,
HELD: Reversed with directions to vacate the order appoint-
ing appellee and to appoint appellant. Under Arizona statute,
marriages by parties of designated degrees of consanguinity
are "incestuous and void"; therefore, marriage between first
cousins who are residents of and intend to live in Arizona are
void even though solemnized in a state where such marriage
is not prohibited by law. In Re Mortenson's Estate, 83 Ariz.
87, 316 P. 2d 1106 (1957).
Prohibition of marriage of persons in direct lineal consan-
guinity was established by Church Canon in early Christen-
dom and by statute in Roman Law. 35 Am. JUR., Marriage
§ 140 (1941). English law, after the Reformation, confined
the concept to the Levitical degrees of relationship defined in
the Holy Scripture. The Queen v. Brighton, 1 Best & Smith
447, 121 Eng. Rep. 782, 12 Eng. Rul. Cas. 738 (1861).
Today, statutory provisions prohibiting the marriage of par-
ties of various degrees of consanguinity are found in all
American jurisdictions, but only a little more than half of
them prohibit marriage of first cousins. 1 VERNIER, AMERI-
CAN FAMILY LAW § 38 (1931) ; CODE OF LAWS OF SOUTH CARO-
LINA, 1952 § 20-1. Whether incestuous marriages are void
or merely voidable depends on the interpretation of local stat-
utes by the courts. Meisenhelder v. Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co.,
170 Minn. 317, 213 N. W. 32, 51 A. L. R. 1408 (1927) ; Wood-
ward v. Blake, 38 N. D. 38, 164 N. W. 156, L. R. A. 1918A 88
(1917). In the absence of express contrary statutory declara-
tion, the prevailing view is that such incestuous marriages are
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merely voidable and are valid unless annulled during the life-
time of the parties. Fensterwald v. Burk, 129 Md. 131, 98
Atl. 358, 3 A. L. R. 1562 (1916); Bennett v. Bennett, 195
S. C. 1, 10 S. E. 2d 23 (1940). Although a statute may con-
tain the word "void" in its provisions, some courts interpret
it to mean "voidable" where legislative intent, determined by
construction, indicates that it should be so interpreted. Harri-
son v. State, 22 Md. 468, 85 Am. Dec. 658 (1864); Hall v.
Baylous, 109 W. Va. 1, 153 S. E. 293 (1930). Some states hold
that, although incestuous marriages are null and void in law,
they are valid for all purposes until nullity is decreed, John-
son v. Landefeld, 138 Fla. 511, 189 So. 666 (1939) ; Walker
v. Walker, 54 Ohio L. Abst. 153, 84 N. E. 2d 258 (1948);
however, a majority of the jurisdictions consider such mar-
riages as absolutely void, Arado v. Arado, 281 Ill. 123, 117
N. E. 816, 4 A. L. R. 28 (1917), and require no court decree
of nullity since they are void ab initio. Sutton v. Leib, 199
F. 2d 163 (7th Cir. 1952); 1 VERNIER, AMERICAN FAMILY
LAW § 38 (1931). A marriage void ab initio may be attacked
in any court proceeding, whether the question arises directly
or collaterally, Sinpson v. Neeley, 221 S. W. 2d 303 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1949) ; Re Gregorson, 160 Cal. 21, 116 Pac. 60, L. R. A.
1916C 697, Ann. Cas. 1912D 1124 (1911), notwithstanding
the death of either or both of the parties. Osoinach v. Wat-
kins, 235 Ala. 564, 180 So. 577, 117 A. L. R. 179 (1938);
Bowers 'v. Bowers, 10 Rich. Eq. 551 (S. C. 1858). Although
the validity of a marriage is generally determined by the law
of the place where it is contracted, 5 R. C. L., Conflict of Laws
§§ 74-76; McConnell v. McConnell, 99 F. Supp. 493 (D. C.
D. C. 1951) ; 35 AM. JUR., Marriage § 167 (1941), each state
has the right to determine the marital status of its citizens
under its laws. Everly v. Baumil, 209 S. C. 287, 39 S. E. 2d
905 (1946) ; 35 AM. JUR., Marriage § 168 (1941). Marriages
valid where celebrated are usually valid everywhere, except
those contrary to laws of nature and those which the law has
declared invalid on grounds of public policy. Meisenhelder v.
Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co., supra; Osoinach v. Watkins, supra;
RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 132 (1934).
Although variations among the states in the degree of con-
sanguinity prohibited by statute are minor, that of first cou-
sins is one of considerable controversy. The major difficulty,
however, is whether prohibited marriages are void or merely
[Vol. 10
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voidable. Only a few states are silent, as South Carolina is,
on the question as far as statutory law is concerned. The
instant case is in line with the view of the majority of states
in holding incestuous marriages void by statute. Under the
guise of prohibiting acts abhorrent to the nature of civilized
man and preventing deterioration of the race by the produc-
tion of degenerate and deficient offspring, jurisdictions em-
bracing the majority view often overlook the fact that inno-
cent children are cast into bastardy and deprived of legal
rights. On the other hand, jurisdictions declaring incestuous
marriages merely voidable give rise to the peculiar existence
of valid marriages in which the parties are subject to action
for incest. A few legislatures have provided an equitable
solution to the problem by enacting statutes making such mar-
riages void ab initio, but making offspring of void marriages
legitimate.
R. D. BATES.
DOMESTIC RELATIONS - Parent and Child - Ef-
fect in Divorce Proceeding of an Antenuptial Agreement
Regarding the Religious Training of Children. - A cou-
ple contemplating marriage entered into a contract whereby
they agreed that the children of the marriage should be reared
in the Roman Catholic religion of the husband. In an action
for divorce instituted by the wife, a Protestant, the trial court
struck from the defendant's answer the antenuptial contract
and those allegations which sought to enforce the provisions
of the contract relating to the religious training of the chil-
dren. The divorce and custody of the children were granted
to the wife. On appeal, HELD: Affirmed. Parents cannot
by contract relating to the religious training of their children
restrict the discretion of the court in awarding custody, and
the court may disregard entirely any such contract. Stanton
v. Stanton, 213 Ga. 545, 100 S. E. 2d 289 (1957).
At English common law the rights of the father to the cus-
tody and education of his children were paramount, and no
mere agreement as to the religious education of children be-
tween father and mother before marriage was binding as a
legal contract. In re Nevin, 2 Ch. 299 (1891) ; In re Agar-
Ellis, 24 Ch. D. 317 (1883) ; Andrews v. Salt, L. R. 8 Ch. App.
622 (1873). No damages could be recovered for a breach of
the contract in a court of law, and it could not be enforced
3
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by a suit for specific performance in equity. Andrews v. Salt,
supra. The modern American tendency to equalize the rights
of the two parents as to their children has led to enactment
in a number of jurisdictions of statutes by which mother and
father are declared to be joint guardians of their children
with equal rights of custody and control. CODE OF LAWS OF
SOUTH CAROLINA, 1952 § 31-51, Powell v. Powell, 231 S. C.
283, 98 S. E. 2d 764 (1957) ; 39 Am. JUR., Parent and Child
§ 9 (1942). Therefore, in awarding the custody of children,
the paramount consideration must be their physical, moral
and spiritual welfare and their best interests, to which tech-
nical legal rights of the parties must yield. Koon v. Koon,
203 S. C. 556, 28 S. E. 2d 89 (1943) ; Graydon v. Graydon,
150 S. C. 117, 147 S. E. 749 (1929) ; In re Butcher's Estate,
266 Pa. 479, 109 Atl. 683 (1920) ; SCHOULER, DIVORCE MAN-
UAL § 296 (1944). Generally, American courts have held that
the parent receiving custody is not bound by a previous con-
tract, the right of custody carrying with it as an incident the
right as well as the duty to direct a child's education, reli-
gious and secular. McLaughlin v. McLaughlin, 20 Conn. Sup.
278, 132 A. 2d 420 (1957); Brewer v. Cary, 148 Mo. App.
193, 127 S. W. 685 (1910) ; Boerger v. Boerger, 26 N. J. Super.
90, 97 A. 2d 419 (1953). In refusing to enforce these ante-
nuptial agreements courts have utilized a variety of reasons,
among them being that equity does not have jurisdiction
where statutory provisions exist for the determination of the
care and custody of children. Dumais v. Dumais, 152 Me.
24, 122 A. 2d 322 (1956) ; Brewer v. Cary, supra. Also, such
an agreement may be against public policy, in that a parent
should not be held to bind himself conclusively to relinquish
control over his children's religious education. Hernandez et
al. v. Thomas, 50 Fla. 522, 39 So. 641, 2 L. R. A. 203 (1905) ;
Brewer v. Cary, supra. Finally, some courts will not make a
determination as to differences in religious belief, on the
ground that enforcement would violate the freedom of re-
ligion provisions of the First Amendment of the Federal
Constitution as made applicable to state actions by the Four-
teenth Amendment. Lynch v. Uhlenhopp, - Iowa -, 78 N.
W. 2d 491 (1956) (dictum) (see dissenting opinion) ; Denton
v. James, 107 Kan. 729, 193 Pac. 307, 12 A. L. R. 1146 (1920).
But see Magee v. O'Neill, 19 S. C. 170, 186 (1882). The doc-
trine of estoppel will not be employed to enforce the agree-
[Vol. 10
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ment. Boerger v. Boerger, supra. But see Ramon v. Ramon,
34 N. Y. S. 2d 100 (1942). However, there are statements
from highly authoritative sources to the effect that such ante-
nuptial agreements are enforceable. WILLISTON, CONTRACTS
§ 1744a n. 3 (1938) states: "Agreements between parents re-
lating to the religious training of their children are gen-
erally upheld. See Denton v. James, 107 Kan. 729, 193 Pac.
307, 12 A. L. R. 1146; In re Butcher's Estate, 266 Pa. 479,
109 Atl. 683; .. ." And in extending enforceability to a con-
tiact between a mother and a third person, the Court of Ap-
peals in Weinberger v. Van Hessen, 260 N. Y. 294, 183 N. E.
429 (1932) said: "Agreements between parents for a particu-
lar sort of religious upbringing have generally been held valid
in this country. See 29 HARv. L. REV. 485; Denton v. James,
107 Kan. 729 .... " It is doubtful, however, that the cases
relied upon either by Williston or by the Court of Appeals in
Weinberger v. Van Hessen support their propositions. Each
seems to be authority for the contrary position that the con-
tracts are unenforceable. See Pfeffer, Religion in the Up-
bringing of Children, 35 B. U. L. REV. 333, 360 (1955). A few
courts have expressed the view that in fixing custody they
will give no consideration to religion whatsoever, but will,
and necessarily must, decide the controversy as if that factor
were completely absent. Describes v. Wilmer, 69 Ala. 25
(1881) ; Jones v. Bowman, 13 Wyo. 79, 77 Pac. 439 (1904).
Other courts have recognized that religion is an important
component of a child's best interests and should be given con-
sideration, but it does not control the court in its determina-
tion of the right of custody. Cooper v. Hinrichs, 10 Ill. 269,
140 N. E. 2d 293, 297 (1957) ; Winter v. Winter, 184 Iowa
85, 166 N. W. 274 (1918) ; Donahue v. Donahue, 147 N. J.
Eq. 701, 61 A. 2d 243 (1948). Therefore, for one reason or
another, the authorities are almost unanimous in refusing
to accord legal effect to agreements seeking to control the
religious education of children. Boerger v. Boerger, supra;
Friedman, The Parental Right to Control the Religious Educa-
tion of a Child, 29 HARv. L. REV. 489, 492 (1916).
The problem of the legal enforceability of antenuptial agree-
ments regarding the religious education of children is of spe-
cial importance to a Catholic contemplating marriage with a
Protestant. The general rule in divorce actions prohibits the
parents by agreement from binding the court so far as to
1958]
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prevent it from taking into consideration the temporal well-
being of the child when making awards as to custody. The
courts undoubtedly would recognize that the right of custody
includes the privilege. of dictating the religious teachings
which the child shall subsequently receive. Presumably, if
enforcement of the agreement would not prejudice the
child's welfare it might be enforceable. However, as a practi-
cal matter, it would appear improbable that equity would en-
force a suit for specific performance. Even assuming the
contract to be valid, it would be virtually impossible to assess
damages in an action at law for breach of the contract.
(Quaere: If valid, would an action lie to recover damages
for mental suffering alone? See RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS §
341 [1933]). Conceivably, to specifically enforce the agree-
ment against the parent who receives custody of minor
children in a divorce action would be self-defeating, the effect
being to erect a religious barrier between child and parent,
thereby destroying the temporal happiness that the custody
award was designed to insure for the child. Although the
problem has not as yet arisen in South Carolina, as a matter
of general policy it would seem likely that its courts would re-
fuse enforcement of antenuptial contracts as such, deciding
each case oil the basis of what would best serve the child's
general welfare.
VICTOR S. EVANS.
UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION - Rights to Com-
pensation - Pregnant Employee. - Claimant, an employee
of appellant, and a member of the union representing the
workers of appellant company, requested, and was granted a
six months leave of absence in accordance with a collective bar-
gaining agreement between appellant and the union. Claimant
was four months pregnant when the leave period began. The
agreement provided that "female employees, in case of mater-
nity, shall have the right to six (6) months leave of absence as
they may choose." In addition to this, there were other provi-
sions which protected the employee's seniority rights during
her absence, and if additional time was required at the end of
the six month period, the employee could acquire it for one
month at a time upon presentation to appellant of a physician's
certificate indicating that such additional time was necessary.
Should the doctor rule that claimant was fit to return to work
[Vol. 10
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and she failed to do so, under the agreement, she would lose
all seniority. When claimant's leave period began she ex-
pected the birth of her child to be on or about October 4,
1955, and it was on this expectation that the leave of absence
was granted; however, the child was not born until Novem-
ber 22, 1955. Three weeks after the birth, claimant notified
appellant that she was ready to return to work, but she was
refused work by appellant. Claimant then filed her claim for
unemployment compensation, but was refused these benefits
by the referee who asserted that claimant's unemployment
was voluntary and without good cause under the Pennsylvania
Unemployment Compensation Laws. The Unemployment Com-
pensation Board of Review reversed the referee's decision.
HELD: Affirmed. The facts do not show that claimant was
unemployed voluntarily and without good cause or through
any fault of her own. When claimant acted in good faith in
her attempt to re-establish the employer-employee relation-
ship, she fulfilled the statutory requirements; therefore, claim-
ant was entitled to unemployment compensation benefits. E.
W. Twitchell, Inc. v. Unemployment Compensation Board of
Review, 184 Pa. Super. 518, 135 A. 2d 824 (1957).
All rights which may be acquired with respect to unemploy-
ment compensation are founded on statutes, rather than the
common law. Beeland Wholesale Co. v. Kaufman, 234 Ala.
249, 174 So. 516 (1937) ; National Tunnel & Mines Co. v. In-
dustrial Commission, 99 Utah 39, 102 P. 2d 508 (1940). Only
those workers who meet the statutory requirements and con-
ditions are allowed benefits of unemployment compensation.
Battaglia v. Board of Review of Employment Sec. of Dept. of
Labor & Industry, 14 N. J. Super. 24, 81 A. 2d 186 (1951) ;
Copeland v. Oklahoma Employment See. Commission, 197 Old.
429, 172 P. 2d 420 (1946). The eligibility or qualification of
a claimant for unemployment compensation does not ordi-
narily depend on his economic needs, Copeland v. Oklahoma
Employment See. Commission, supra; Keystone Min. Co. v.
Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 167 Pa. Super.
256, 75 A. 2d 3 (1950) ; W. U. Tel. Co. v. Texas Employment
Commission, 243 S. W. 2d 217 (Tex. Civ. App.), writ of error
dismissed, 150 Tex. 513, 243 S. W. 2d 154 (1954), and though
the claimant must be "unemployed" within the meaning of the
statutes, as the term is used and defined therein, Battaglia
v. Board of Review of Division of Employment See. of Dept.
1958]
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of Labor & Industry, supra; Urbach v. Unemployment Com-
pensation Board of Review, 169 Pa. Super. 569, 83 A. 2d 392
(1951), his unemployment may be sufficient to entitle him
to unemployment compensation benefits if such unemployment
is total or partial in its nature. Phillips v. Michigan Unem-
ployment Compensation Commission, 323 Mich. 188, 35 N. W.
2d 237 (1948) ; Homer Laughlin China Co. v. Hix, 128 W. Va.
613, 37 S. E. 2d 649 (1946). The primary purpose of unem-
ployment compensation benefits is to provide relief to those
employees who are involuntarily unemployed. Unemployment
Comp. Comm. v. Willis Barber & Beauty Shop, 219 N. C. 709,
15 S. E. 2d 4 (1941) ; Sinclair Refining Co. v. Unemployment
Compensation Commission, 189 Va. 692, 54 S. E. 2d 72 (1949) ;
Moorman Mfg. Co. v. Industrial Commission, 241 Wis. 200,
5 N. W. 2d 743 (1942). Unemployment compensation benefits
are generally extended only to those who become unemployed
through no fault of their own. Bedwell v. Review Board of
Ind. Employ. Sec. Div., 119 Ind. App. 607, 88 N. E. 2d 916
(1949); Wolf's v. Iowa Employment Sec. Commission, 244
Iowa 999, 59 N. W. 2d 216 (1953); Pramco, Inc. v. Un-
employment Compensation Board of Review, - Pa. Super.
-, 138 A. 2d 210 (1958). Employees who leave their work
voluntarily are generally disqualified from receiving unem-
ployment compensation funds, and such disqualification may
be entirely or in some cases for a waiting period. Moulton v.
Iowa Employment See. Commission, 239 Iowa 1161, 34 N. W.
2d 211 (1948) ; Moen v. Director of Div. of Employment See.,
324 Mass. 246, 85 N. E. 2d 779, 8 A. L. R. 2d 429 (1949).
Involuntary unemployment, as required by some state stat-
utes as a condition of eligibility for benefits, has been held
not to embrace situations where one becomes unemployed be-
cause of sickness or change in personal circumstances. Cela-
nese Corp. of America v. Bartlett, 200 Md. 397, 90 A. 2d 208
(1952) ; Judson Mills v. South Carolina Unemployment Com-
pensation Commission, 204 S. C. 37, 28 S. E. 2d 535 (1943) ;
State v. Hix, 132 W. Va. 516, 54 S. E. 2d 198 (1949). Under
some statutes, a worker is eligible for benefits where his un-
employment is voluntary but with good or "jusf' cause.
Intertown Corp. v. Appeal Board of Mich. Unemployment
Comp. Commission, 238 Mich. 363, 43 N. W. 2d 888 (1950);
Hoffstot v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review,
164 Pa. Super. 43, 63 A. 2d 355 (1949) ; Bliley Elec. Co. v.
[Vol. 10
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Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 158 Pa. Super.
548, 45 A. 2d 898, 903 (1946). Where good cause is shown,
even though the unemployment was voluntary, it will be
classified as involuntary under these statutes, and benefits
may be granted. Raffety v. Iowa Employment See. Commis-
sion, 247 Iowa 896, 76 N. W. 2d 787 (1956) ; Bliley Electric
Co. v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, supra.
Good faith is an essential element of good cause. Dwight Mfg.
Co. v. Long, 36 Ala. App. 387, 56 So. 2d 685 (1952) ; Erie Re-
sistor Corp. v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review,
172 Pa. Super. 430, 94 A. 2d 367 (1953) ; Flannick v. Unem-
ployment Compensation Board of Review, 168 Pa. Super. 606,
82 A. 2d 671 (1951). It has been held that a worker who quits
work due to pregnancy is disqualified for benefits where the
statute disqualified workers who voluntarily left their work
without good cause attributable to the employer. Moulton v.
Iowa Employment See. Commission, 239 Iowa 1161, 34 N. W.
2d 211 (1948). The same result was also reached under a
statute which disqualified workers who left their employment
voluntarily without good cause, but which did not expressly
require that the good cause be attributable to the employer
or the employment. John Morrell & Co. v. Unemployment
Compensation Commission, 69 S. D. 618, 13 N. W. 2d 498
(1944). However, some statutes expressly provide for un-
employment compensation benefits to pregnant workers who
quit work because of pregnancy. Alabama Mills v. Carnley,
35 Ala. App. 46, 44 So. 2d 622, 14 A. L. R. 2d 1301, cert. de-
nied, 253 Ala. 426, 44 So. 2d 627 (1950) ; Auger v. Adminis-
trator, Unemployment Compensation Act, 19 Conn. Super. 184,
110 A. 2d 645 (1954). When a pregnant worker leaves her
employment, and the leaving can be construed as a temporary
leave of absence, she should apply for a leave of absence, or
manifest her intention not to leave the labor force in some
other manner. Schwartz v. Unemployment Compensation
Board of Review, 169 Pa. Super. 620, 84 A. 2d 364 (1951);
Flannick v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review,
168 Pa. Super. 606, 82 A. 2d 671 (1951). In the final analysis,
the question of what is good cause must be determined in the
light of the facts of each particular case, and the standard for
making such a determination is the standard of reasonable-
ness as applied to the average man or woman. Department
of Industrial Relations v. Mann, 35 Ala. App. 505, 50 So. 2d
1958]
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780, cert. stricken, 255 Ala. 201, 50 So. 2d 786 (1950) ; Van-
cheri v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 177
Pa. Super. 553, 112 A. 2d 433 (1955). Where collective bar-
gaining agreements contain provisions for leaves of absence
for pregnant workers, such agreements are not always deter-
minative of the employee's right to unemployment compensa-
tion benefits when such employee cannot regain her employ-
ment status at the expiration of the leave period and/or has
acted in good faith. Auger v. Administrator, Unemployment
Compensation Act, 19 Conn. Super. 184, 110 A. 2d 645 (1954) ;
Myerson v. Board of Review, 43 N. J. Super. 196, 128 A. 2d
15 (1957).
Generally, under the various state statutes, a woman who
quits work because of pregnancy is disqualified for unemploy-
ment compensation benefits. However, there is an increasing
amount of authority to the contrary. Since all of the states
have their own unemployment compensation laws, and since
they all differ in some degree as to who may become eligible
for benefits, it is difficult to determine just when and how a
pregnant worker may become eligible for benefits. Each case
must be decided in the light of the facts and circumstances
surrounding that particular case. There is no clear-cut rule
of law to be applied. Pregnant workers present a peculiar
problem in the administering of unemployment benefits, and
the instant case is a good illustration showing why all factors
concerning the employer-employee relationship must be dealt
with in reaching the correct result. Logically, any statutory
presumption that a pregnant worker is not entitled to benefits
should be rebuttable, rather than conclusive. In the instant
case there was the presumption that the worker was not en-
titled to benefits because of the provisions of the state's un-
employment compensation statute which did not allow benefits
to pregnant workers generally. However, this presumption
was rebutted and benefits allowed on the ground that the em-
phasis embodied in the collective bargaining agreement was
on seniority rights of the employee, rather than on any rights
which the employee might be entitled to under the socially
designed unemployment program. Since the claimant acted
in good faith in her attempt to return to work, she qualified
for benefits under the statute. The fact that she left work
because of pregnancy was immaterial in so far as her eligi-
bility was concerned. Claimant's establishment of good faith
[Vol. 10
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and availability for work placed her in the same category as
any other worker who quit work voluntarily with good cause.
ALLEN LEVERN RAY.
TORTS - Imputed Contributory Negligence - Bailor-
Bailee. - Action by the owner of an automobile for dam-
ages to his car which was being driven at the time of the
accident by his employee, wherein the driver of the other auto-
mobile counterclaimed for damages to his automobile and for
personal injuries. The lower court found that plaintiff's em-
ployee was neither his servant nor agent at the time of the
accident as he was not acting within the scope of his em-
ployment, and further found that the drivers of both auto-
mobiles were negligent. The lower court directed a verdict
against both parties. On appeal, plaintiff alleged that the
lower court was in error in holding that he could not recover
for damages to his automobile because of his employee's con-
tributory negligence. HELD: Reversed. Since the employee
was neither servant nor agent of plaintiff car owner at the
time of the accident, their relationship was that of bailor-
bailee, and the contributory negligence of the bailee is not
imputable to the bailor in an action by the bailor for dam-
ages to his automobile against a negligent third party. Howle
v. McDaniel, 232 S. C. 125, 101 S. E. 2d 255 (1957).
The doctrine of imputed negligence whereby one party is
charged with the negligence of another is generally regarded
as having arisen in England in 1849 in the case of Thorogood
v. Bryan, 8 C. B. 115, 137 Eng. Rep. 452 (1849), and remained
the law of England until 1888, when it was finally discarded
by the House of Lords. Mills et al. v. Armstrong, L. R. 13
App. Cas. 1 (1888). During this period the doctrine was
adopted in various jurisdictions in this country which specifi-
cally cited Thorogood v. Bryan, supra, as the basis for their
decisions. Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. Sims, 77 Miss. 325, 27 So.
527, 49 L. R. A. 323 (1900) ; Lockhart v. Lichtenthaler, 46
Pa. 151 (1863) ; Prideaux v. City of Mineral Point, 43 Wisc.
513 (1878). Except in special relationships, most courts have
now repudiated the doctrine of imputed negligence so that the
recognized common law rule in the United States today is that
in situations involving damages occasioned by the negligent
driver of an automobile and the negligence of a third person,
the negligence of the driver will not be imputed to the owner
1958] 515 1
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of the automobile or to a party riding in the vehicle to pre-
vent his recovery against that third person, or to make him
responsible for the driver's negligence. Little v. Hackett.
116 U. S. 366 (1886); Bricker v. Green, 313 Mich. 218, 21
N. W. 2d 105 (1946). Where it appears that the driver was
at the time of the accident acting as the servant or agent
of the owner, the undisputed rule is that the negligence of
such driver will be imputed to the owner to hold him liable
for damages to the person or property of a third party, Holder
v. Haylnes, 193 S. C. 176, 7 S. E. 2d 833 (1940); McFaddin
v. Anderson Motor Co., 121 S. C. 407, 114 S. E. 402 (1922),
and that where the third party has also been negligent, the
driver's contributory negligence will be imputed to the owner
to prevent his recovery for damages to his own automobile.
Watts v. Safeway Cab & Storage Co., 193 Ark. 413, 100 S. W.
2d 965 (1937) ; Ballou v. Fitzpatrick, 283 Mass. 336, 186 N. E.
668 (1933). Where a bailor has in some way been negligent
himself he will be held liable for injuries to a third party that
occur as a result of such negligence, Saunders v. Prue, 235
Mo. App. 1245, 151 S. W. 2d 478 (1941) ; Kantola v. Lovell
Auto Co., 157 Ore. 534, 72 P. 2d 61 (1937), and where a plain-
tiff's negligence is a proximate contributing cause of a col-
lision, it will be a bar to his recovery from a defendant who
has been negligent. Rogers v. Cox, 75 A. 2d 776 (D. C. 1950) ;
Winfrey v. Witherspoon's Inc., 260 Ala. 371, 71 So. 2d 37
(1954). Many jurisdictions, although South Carolina is not
among them, have statutes which impute to the owner of an
automobile the negligence of the person driving it with his
knowledge or consent, so as to hold the owner responsible for
any damages which are caused to a third person by his auto-
mobile through the negligence of such driver, but most of
them make no reference to imputing such negligence to the
owner in any effort by him to recover against a negligent
third party. D. C. CODE 1940, s. 40-401; I. C. A. 321.493;
M. S. A. 170.04. Some of these jurisdictions will impute to
the owner the contributory negligence of the driver so as to
bar his recovery from the negligent third party for damages
to his automobile, National Trucking & Storage Co. v. Driscoll,
64 A. 2d 304 (D. C. 1949) ; Di Leo v. Du Montier, 195 So. 74
(La. 1940), while others will not prevent the owner from re-
covering from such third person because of the contributory
negligence of his driver. Stuart v. Pilgrim, 247 Iowa 709, 74
[Vol. 10
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N. W. 2d 212 (1956) ; Christenson v. Hennepin Transportation
Co., 215 Minn. 394, 10 N. W. 2d 406, 147 A. L. R. 945 (1943) ;
Mills v. Gabriel, 259 App. Div. 60, 18 N. Y. S. 2d 78 (1940).
The common law rule, which South Carolina follows in absence
of statute, is that the contributory negligence of the bailee
is not imputable to the bailor in an action by the bailor for
damages to his automobile against a negligent third party.
Lloyd v. Northern Pacific Railway Co., 107 Wash. 57, 181
Pac. 29, 6 A. L. R. 307 (1919) ; New York, L. E. & W. R. Co.
v. New Jersey Electric R. Co., 60 N. J. L. 838, 38 Atl. 828
(1897) ; Rogers v. Saxton, 305 Pa. 479, 158 Atl. 166, 80 A. L.
R. 280 (1931).
The view taken by our Supreme Court in the instant case
is clearly in accord with that of the majority of the courts
in this country today. The theory in the early bailor-bailee
cases was that the bailor was responsible for the bailee's negli-
gence on the ground that he had a right to control even if he
did not exercise it, and therefore, was chargeable with the
bailee's negligence. However, the doctrine of imputing the
contributory negligence of a driver to an owner where the
latter's so-called "right to control" stemmed merely from the
particular relationship of bailor-bailee has been almost uni-
versally rejected. Many authorities today further urge that
the doctrine of imputed negligence should be abandoned in its
entirety, even in such special relationships where it is still
applied as in the principal-agent and master-servant situa-
tions. Lessler, Imputed Negligence, 25 CONN. BAR JOURNAL
30 (1951). It seems illogical to hold that, although a bailee
is personally liable to a bailor for damages occasioned by his
negligence in operating the bailor's car, the very same negli-
gence which contributes to the bailor's injury could be im-
puted to the bailor in an action against a third party for in-
juries arising out of such third party's negligence. The cor-
rect view should be, as was held in the present case, that only
one's own negligence should operate as a bar to recovery
against such third party.
HARvEy G. SANDERS, JR.
1958]
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A RECENT GIFT
The Law Library of the University of South Carolina has
just received, through Ex-Governor James F. Byrnes, a copy
of one of the earlier compilations of the South Carolina Stat-
utes popularly known as Grimke's Public Laws. This volume
was presented to the Law Library by Mr. David Lawrence,
Editor of U. S. News and World Report, and includes all of
the public laws of South Carolina from its establishment as a
British province down through the year 1790. Included in
the volume are such "statutes of Great Britain as were made
of force by the Act of Assembly of 1712", as well as such
other statutes "as before enacted or declared to be of force
in this State, either virtually or expressly". The volume also
contains the Constitution of the United States with amend-
ments and "the newly adopted Constitution of the State of
South Carolina".
Grimke's Public Laws is the third compilation of early stat-
ute law published in South Carolina. The first such collection
of laws was published in London in 1704 and is popularly re-
ferred to as the "Folio Laws". The second statutory compila-
tion was published in 1736 in Charleston and edited by Nich-
olas Trott, an Englishman and one of the earlier Chief Jus-
tices of South Carolina.
Judge John Faucheraud Grimke, the editor of this volume,
was born December 16, 1752, and died August 9, 1819. He
was elected a Judge of the Courts of Law in 1783 and was
Speaker of the House of Representatives in 1785-86. At that
time there was no prohibition against a Judge being a member
of the Legislature as well as the Judiciary. It appears that
he received his legal education at Westminster and "was one
of a number of young Americans in London who petitioned
George III against those measures which infringed upon the
rights of the Colonists . . . ". He was noted for his habit
of stern rule which probably dated back to his service as a
Lt. Colonel of artillery during the Revolution. An attempt
was made to impeach Judge Grimke in 1811 at which time
he was defended by Daniel E. Huger, who speaking of Judge
Grimke stated, "Mr. Speaker, I have not spoken more than
half an hour for the honorable and venerable gentleman be-
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fore you without tiring, when he for us, without tiring,
fought seven years". The articles of impeachment failed to
pass.
Not only is this volume valued as a rare book but it also
has practical value for researchers in early South Carolina
legal history. The Law Library is indeed fortunate to receive
this valuable addition to its holdings.
SARAH LEVERETTE*
*A.B., University of South Carolina; LL.B., University of South
Carolina, School of Law; Law Librarian, University of South Carolina,
School of Law.
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